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ALICE IN WONDERLAND MEETS THE U.S. PATENT
SYSTEM
Jay Dratler, Jr.∗
Among the joys of being a professor, as distinguished from
practicing law, are the leisure and incentive to think and write about the
big picture. Another joy is being able to say what you really think. We
professors don’t have to focus on attracting clients or maintaining an
impression of studied understatement and moderation for judges and
juries.
In this talk, I’m going to exercise both of these prerogatives. I’ve
been thinking about the big picture in patents for over a quarter century,
and I’m more worried than I’ve ever been.
Let me begin by making my usual (and truthful) disclaimer. I’m
not one of those academics who delights in being a gadfly and finding
cause for alarm in every new law and every twist and turn of legal
history. I’m the author of three treatises—on intellectual property
generally,1 licensing,2 and cyberlaw.3 I’ve spent much of the last
thirteen years of my life writing and revising them. Like treatises
generally, each largely describes and explains our current intellectual
property system, and each finds much to like in what both recent and
earlier history have wrought. More fundamentally, I strongly subscribe
to the view that the robust intellectual property system of AngloAmerican society is in part responsible for our society’s extraordinary
∗ Jay Dratler, Jr., Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, University of Akron School of Law
for presentation at The Sixth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law
and Policy at Akron, Ohio, March 15, 2004. Copyright 2004 to Jay Dratler, Jr. Permission granted
to copy for personal use by individuals (not groups) for any nonprofit purpose, and for any nonprofit
use confined to the University of Akron. All other rights reserved.
1. JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Law Journal Press 1991) (two volumes, updated semiannually) [hereinafter
1 DRATLER].
2. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Law Journal Press 1994)
(two volumes, updated semiannually).
3. JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
(Law Journal Press 2000) (one volume, updated semiannually).
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economic success over the last four centuries.
But the warning signs of excess are everywhere. One need look no
farther than the Federal Trade Commission’s White Paper that is the
subject of today’s discussion.4 Think about it. Congress has clipped the
FTC’s policy wings so often that it’s a wonder the agency can fly at all.
Moreover, for the first time in decades, the executive and legislative
branches of our government are controlled by Republicans, who have
not generally been zealous advocates for aggressive antitrust
enforcement and “pruning” the IP laws. Yet even in this very
conservative political environment, the FTC—a much-chastened
agency—has proposed ten recommendations (fourteen, if you count the
subheads) for reining in the patent system.5 If that isn’t a clear sign that
something desperately needs attention, I don’t know what is.
Therefore I’m going to take the premise of my talk—that something
is wrong—for granted. In the short time that I have, I’d like to explore
three further questions. First, what is wrong? Second, how can we fix
it? And third, how important is it that we do so?
I. WHY THESE ISSUES MATTER
Let me take the third question first. How important are these
issues, anyway? Does it really matter if too many patents issue and that
their claims are too broad? For two reasons, I think it matters a lot.
The attached article6 outlines in some detail why I think it matters
in two particular fields—software and business methods—in which the
PTO has issued, and the Federal Circuit has upheld, what I think are too
many patents on non-inventions. The following remarks take a broader
and longer-range view of patents generally.
The first reason why having a properly balanced patent system
matters relates to the historical period in which we find ourselves. The
world is now in the process of transferring the self-evident benefits of
robust innovation, free markets, and free trade from Anglo-American
and other advanced societies to the rest of the planet. This transfer,
often pejoratively termed “globalization” by “multinational
corporations,” involves far more than mere globalized marketing of
4. To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy,
A Report by the Federal Trade Commission (October 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/index.htm (containing an index to the document in Acrobat format) (last visited February 23,
2004) [hereinafter FTC WHITE PAPER].
5. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 7-18 (executive summary of recommendations).
6. Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case against Software and BusinessMethod Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003) [hereinafter DARCY ARTICLE].
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American products and far more than just the largest industrial
combines. It is an extremely complex, far-reaching process. In the long
run, it is likely not only to improve the standard of living in, but also to
democratize, much of the planet. When the history of this period has
been written, this transition may be as important as—or even more
important than—the Industrial Revolution. Innovation and the patent
laws that encourage it are, of course, a vital part of this process.
The internationalizing trend is probably irreversible, although
retrenchment and backsliding no doubt will occur. In the short term, the
transfer of wealth and jobs from advanced to poorer societies that
attends it will cause considerable pain on the part of workers in the
developed world. As many have noted, innovation and the laws that
protect it are among the few bright spots for developed nations in the
short term. Therefore, innovation and the laws governing it are
exceedingly important, both for insuring the well-being of workers in the
United States and other developed countries and thereby insuring that
this inevitable long-term change proceeds with as little short-term pain
as possible. If United States patent law provides the wrong balance and
impairs innovation instead of fostering it, it will make the short-term
pain in our country more acute, and perhaps longer, than it need be.
The second reason why patents and laws governing innovation are
so important is seldom stated but perhaps most fundamental. The patent
system and those laws affect a value we Americans perhaps hold most
dear: liberty. Liberty is not only a matter of human rights or freedom
from tyranny. There is such a thing as economic liberty. Indeed, as raw
tyranny of the type exemplified by Saddam Hussein recedes from the
world stage, economic liberty no doubt will become more and more
important.
By virtue of his race, Justice Thurgood Marshall was no stranger to
the blessings of liberty and the pain of its denial. Therefore, it is not
surprising that he penned one of the most important and moving paeans
to economic liberty ever written in a judicial opinion. When I used to
teach antitrust law, I read his words aloud at some point in every class,
and I’d like to read them now:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
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muster.7

Of course this passage addresses the antitrust laws, not patent law.
But it is well understood that antitrust law and patent law are just two
sides of the same coin—the coin of economic law. The English
recognized this point nearly four centuries ago, when the Parliament
adopted the Statute of Monopolies.8 That statute imposed a general
prohibition on monopoly,9 much like our Sherman Act,10 but it allowed
patents as an exception to the general rule.11 In the attached article,12 I
argue, inter alia, that American law should be similarly interpreted, as
rule and exception, despite the fact that our Sherman Act was not
adopted for nearly a century after our Constitution was ratified.13
How does economic law, including patents, affect economic
liberty? To answer that question, we need only look at the industry—
software—in which our runaway patent system has most nearly run off
the tracks. The notorious case of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.14 exemplifies the problem. The alleged
“inventor” there had written a pedestrian computer program to manage a
certain type of investment vehicle, a “hub and spoke” investment
partnership.15 The program made pedestrian arithmetic calculations,
mostly as required by rules of the SEC and other accounting and tax
authorities.16 Nothing in the claims at issue addressed any particular
7. United States v. Topco Assoc.., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
8. “An Act concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with penall Lawes and the Forfeyture
thereof,” 21 Jam., c.3 (1623), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1212 (1810) [hereinafter
STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES]. For further discussion of this seminal source of all modern economic
law, its close resemblance to the United States’ Sherman Act, and its relevance to modern patent
law and policy, see DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 823-30.
9. See STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, § 1 (decreeing in part that “all monopolies
and all commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and letter patent heretofore made or granted . . . of or
for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything within this realm . . . , are and
shall be utterly void. . . .”).
10. Among other things, the Statute of Monopolies relied on common law and, case-by-case
application to avoid circumvention and provided for treble damages and costs to prevailing
plaintiffs. See id. § 2, § 4(1) - (2). See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 825-26. Cf. Sherman
Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (prohibiting monopolization) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2004)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38. Stat. 730 (1914) (providing for treble damages, costs, and
attorneys’ fees for successful plaintiff) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2004)).
11. See STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, §§ 6, 10. See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra
note 6, at 826.
12. See generally DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6.
13. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 823-33.
14. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
15. See id. at 1371-72. See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 862-63, 871-74.
16. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1371-72.
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algorithm, programming technique or method of programming.17 For all
those claims revealed, the alleged “inventor” had done nothing more
than write a pedestrian computer program for performing routine
arithmetic calculations dictated by legal authority, using programming
languages, techniques and computers invented—if at all—by someone
else.18
The claims, however, were not limited to any particular
programming methods; they were broad enough to cover any computer
program used in any manner to control that type of business. The
district court, recognizing this point, invalidated the patent as directed to
unpatentable subject matter,19 but the Federal Circuit reversed.20 Since
the type of business involved could hardly be run today without
programmed digital computers, the result of this decision was to give the
inventor of nothing a twenty-year monopoly on a type of investment
vehicle: a business method.21
How do decisions like this affect economic liberty? Very
negatively, I would say. Think of yourself as a young stockbroker or
investment banker creating new and imaginative investment vehicles,
whether of the hub-and-spoke or of another variety. If you consult with
patent counsel, she will tell you that you have to get permission from
this patentee to do so, perhaps paying a portion of your profits, and that,
unless you buy a license, the patentee can stop your business on a whim.
You ask her what programming method the patent covers, and she
answers none: it covers any use of computers to run that type of business
that you want to devise. So what do you do? Most likely, you forget
about your new business ideas and go back to flogging stocks. That
certainly doesn’t sound like the free, entrepreneurial America that I was
raised to revere.
You might say that State Street was an aberration, and, indeed, in
the long sweep of American patent law and policy, it probably was. But
lately the patent bar, the Federal Circuit, and the PTO seem to have been

17. See id. (reciting part of key patent claim).
18. I am hardly the only commentator to notice this anomaly. See John R. Thomas, The
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1156-57 (1999).
19. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 516 (D.
Mass. 1996), rev’d, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
20. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1376-77 (quoting district court’s finding that valid patent
would provide monopoly over hub-and-spoke investment partnership business, but finding it lawful
patent monopoly).
21. See id. at 1375-76. The Federal Circuit saw a line of cases prohibiting business-method
monopolies as misguided or misinterpreted. Id. For criticism of its reasoning and conclusion, see
DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 871-75.
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swept up by a “land rush” mentality. If intellectual property protection
is good, they seem to say, more protection is necessarily better. And so
we have a seemingly endless procession of patents on such things as
minor improvements of simple mechanical, electrical, and electronic
devices, pedestrian computer programs that any college graduate in
computer science could write, and business methods—seemingly the
very subject of the English Parliament’s prohibition against monopoly
nearly 400 years ago.22 The basic institutions of our patent system seem
to have forgotten entirely the notion of balance that has made the AngloAmerican legal system so successful.
Lest readers think I am alone in decrying the “land rush” mentality,
I would like to quote a short passage from a colleague’s work. Consider
Professor Thomas’ lament:
Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 1968 patent
on a method of swallowing a pill. Now we need scant imagination to
envision patents on corporate ingestion of poison pills as well. With
business and medical techniques firmly under wing, and patents on
sports methods and procedures of psychological analysis trickling out
of the Patent Office, patents appropriating almost any sort of
communicable practice seem easily attainable. Claims to methods
within the disciplines of sociology, political science, economics and
the law appear to present only the nearest frontier for the regime of
patents. Under increasingly permissive Federal Circuit case law,
techniques within such far-flung disciplines as language, the fine arts
and theology also now appear to be within the realm of
patentability.”23

This “land rush” mentality is not just wrongheaded and grossly out
of balance. It has tangible economic costs. Just as the “land rush”
mentality in California’s Gold Rush days left less land for farming and
settling, so the “land rush” mentality in patent law leaves little place for
creative minds to go. Everywhere they turn, someone stands with a
piece of paper and a lawyer in a pin-striped suit saying, “Sorry, you
can’t go here; this set of ideas is mine.” The results of this “no room
here” philosophy on creative minds, I believe, is only beginning to be
felt in such places as Silicon Valley, Silicon Forest, and Route 128. I
think it will get much worse before it gets better.
I first presented the subject matter of this article at the University of
Akron’s Sixth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual
22. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 871-76, 891-92, for more on this point.
23. John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 11631164 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
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Property Law and Policy under the written title “Our Runaway Patent
System: Can we Stop it before it Derails our Economy?” As I prepared
to step up before an audience of 150-odd patent lawyers, it occurred to
me that such a title would not particularly appeal to an audience of those
who make a fine living from the “land rush.” Therefore I proposed a
change in title to the current one. The idea behind the title was a simple
one: using the metaphor of “Alice in Wonderland” to look at our patent
system with fresh eyes. In addition to “softening” what might appear to
be the “radical” cast of this article, the new title captured perfectly its
essence: a review of our patent system from a fresh perspective based on
economics and simple common sense.
Patent lawyers and business people who rely on the present system
all know its fundamental purpose: to create economic incentives for
technical innovation when needed. Yet most of them spend their lives
wholly immersed in the legal and procedural details of procuring and
enforcing patents and the technological details of proving that the
subject matter they want to control deserves a patent. They seldom have
the occasion or the incentive to reflect on how the law and procedure on
which they work daily affects the operation of the general economy.
They have not the time or inclination, nor the motive, to take a fresh
look at our patent system, as it operates today, to see whether it makes
sense.
Enter Alice. Like most patent lawyers, Alice believes passionately
in the value of intellectual property. Although still young, she is widely
read. She knows that the Chinese made three of the most important
inventions in human history: noodles, printing, and gunpowder. She
also knows that, in the second millennium, Western culture surpassed
the Chinese in technical innovation so soundly that virtually all the great
technical inventions of the twentieth century were made in the West, and
virtually none in China. Alice believes firmly that this difference had
nothing to do with race or culture and everything to do with economic
law. Western culture, she thinks, had developed the notion of
intellectual property—economic incentives for innovation—while
Chinese culture appears until recently to have clung to the notion of free
appropriability of ideas, as exemplified in Imperial times by the slogan
“To steal a book is an elegant offense.”24
In this strong belief in the value and necessity of intellectual

24. Professor Alford describes this slogan as “a Chinese saying of unknown provenance.”
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 1 (1995).
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property protection, Alice concurs with most U.S. patent lawyers. She
differs from many of them, however, in three important ways. First, as
the conception of an Englishman,25 Alice naturally knows well the
Statute of Monopolies. Just as strongly as she believes in the value of
intellectual property, she believe that this venerable statute sets out the
proper economic relationship between free competition in free markets
and intellectual-property protection: that of rule and exception. Second,
as the daughter of a mathematician,26 Alice recognizes that economics is
quantitative branch of science. Accordingly, she believes that whatever
economic law decrees, it must make sense in terms of numbers and
measurable economic effect. Finally, as the daughter of a logician,27
Alice believes that all law—especially economic law—should make
basic common sense. At very least, she thinks, it should answer the
most obvious logical questions clearly and well.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH OUR SYSTEM NOW?
So how would our Alice approach the United States patent system?
What question would she ask first? Undoubtedly the first question that
would occur to her would be “what things are patentable?” What types
of things, she would ask, deserve the special incentive of a state-granted
monopoly that, despite the four-century-old prohibition against
monopoly, remove them from the general rule of free competition in free
markets?
After diligent study, I think Alice would be disappointed with the
answer that our current patent system gives to that question. She would
consider it a bad answer in two respects. First, the answer is not very
clear. Second, to the extent it is clear, is doesn’t make much economic
sense. The answer is not clear because it depends in large measure upon
abstractions so airy that they are worthy of medieval scholars.28 It
25. Alice’s creator was an Englishman named Rev. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, a
mathematician and logician who lectured at Oxford for some 26 years. His pen name was Lewis
Carroll.
See
“The
Making
of
Alice
in
Wonderland,”
available
at
http://www.bedtime-story.com/bedtime-story/alice-background.htm (last visited June 23, 2004).
26. See supra note 25.
27. See id.
28. The chief culprit here is the requirement that patentable inventions not be “obvious” in
light of prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004). Properly understood, this requirement is part of the
subject-matter limitation of patent law, not an extraneous criterion. See infra the text accompanying
notes 35-47. But what criterion could possibly be more abstract and evanescent—and more
dependent on the eye of the beholder—than whether something is “obvious”?
In addition, a judge-made rule excludes from patentability “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas[.]” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). Since computer
programming came on the scene as an independent industry in 1968, the courts have tried in vain
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doesn’t make economic sense because those abstractions have little, if
anything, to do with the economic impact of patent monopolies or the
dividing line between prohibited monopolies on businesses and
permitted temporary monopoly on inventions.29
The State Street decision exemplifies the problem. As State Street
marvelously illustrates, the PTO is issuing, and the courts are upholding,
patents on too many things that are not “inventions” in any way that
makes economic sense. Furthermore, they are allowing alleged
inventors to claim such non-inventions so broadly that their patents, in
effect, give them business monopolies of the type that have been
prohibited in Anglo-American law since the English Parliament enacted
the Statute of Monopolies in 1623.
trying to apply this rule—itself highly abstract—to alleged software-related inventions. See DARCY
ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 841-42 & n.6 (citing six failed attempts to define the judge-made
exception for such inventions and concluding: “In addressing software-related innovations, the
courts have tried and rejected so many formulas that the list appears endless.”); 1 DRATLER, supra
note 1, at § 2.02[2][b] (outlining judicial history in more detail).
In State Street and an earlier case, the Federal Circuit tried to cabin the rule by distinguishing
“laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from inventions that produce a “useful,
concrete and tangible result[,]” meaning numbers that one can use. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at
1373, quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
banc majority opinion). This attempt, however, had two signal flaws. First, it confused the question
of patentable subject matter with the distinct statutory requirement than a patentable invention be
“useful” as specified in 35 U.S.C. § 101. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 891 & n.218.
Second and more important, it made the distinction between rule and exception “clear” by virtually
extinguishing the exception. See infra note 47. In defining anything that produces useful numbers
as “concrete” and not “abstract,” the Federal Circuit virtually assured that no viable subject-matter
objection could be made to software related inventions. General Gordius, who cut the eponymous
Gordian knot, would approve.
29. To my knowledge, no one has ever succeeded in articulating a direct relationship between
the criterion of nonobviousness in cognition and any economic effect of the patent system (or the
appropriate balance between the prohibition on business monopolies and the exception for
temporally limited monopolies on inventions). As for the highly abstract distinction between
abstract natural laws, phenomena and ideas on the one hand and concrete inventions on the other,
modern understanding of the physical world has all but erased its significance. Computer programs
are just abstract steps or instructions coded in ways established by human convention, yet they are
the basis of virtually all modern business operations, as well as much in science and engineering.
Moreover, the very basis of life is now understood to be abstract information contained in genetic
sequences of amino-acids. This coalescence of abstract information with business and engineering
operations and the practical characteristics of living organisms has made distinguishing the abstract
from the concrete in patent law a fool’s errand.
The usual rationale for this judge-made exception to patentable subject matter is that the tools
of science, engineering and invention, as distinguished from inventions themselves, are too valuable
and widely applicable to monopolize. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, at § 2.02[2][b][iv][F]. But this
distinction becomes evanescent when both tools and results are expressed in abstractions, such as
steps in a computer program or process or blocks of abstract information in a genetic code. In any
event, the distinction has no economic relevance besides the obvious observation that keeping basic
tools free from monopoly likely will result in more of what those tools build (in this case invention).
Modern science and technology, which recognize that abstract sequences (of computer instructions
or pairs of amino acids) are both the tools of invention and its results, demands a more economically
relevant criterion for line-drawing.
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To give the Federal Circuit and the PTO their due, both of these
defects relate to fundamental line-drawing problems that, in the entire
history of patents, have never been satisfactorily resolved. The first is
the question “what is an invention?” or, in legal terms, “what subject
matter is properly patentable”? The second is how broadly an inventor
may claim what he has invented, i.e., to what extent his patent will cover
things that are similar in concept, result, or method but not exactly the
same. The answers to these questions seem perhaps the most important
aspects of any patent system from an economic perspective, for they
determine what otherwise unlawful monopolies the state may grant and
how far those monopolies may extend in impairing others’ economic
liberty, i.e., others’ freedom to innovate and to compete. Let us
examine, from Alice’s fresh perspective, how the current U.S. patent
systems handles these vital issues.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
Over the course of nearly four centuries,30 the subject-matter
inquiry has undergone a certain evolution in semantics. Yet it has
reached no conceptual resolution that makes self-evident economic
sense. Part of the problem is that the issue of subject matter relates to,
and is often confused with, the other requirements for patentable
inventions.
In 1623, the English Parliament approved, as an exception to the
Statute of Monopolies, patents for “new Manufactures within this
Realm[.]”31 Besides introducing the separate requirement of
“novelty”32—a universal requirement for patent protection today33—this
formulation limited patents to “Manufactures.” If our own patent statute
contained only that word, it might, for example, have eliminated the
30. The Statute of Monopolies, which contained an exception for patents, was enacted in
England in 1623. STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8.
31. STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, § 6 (permitting, as exception to general
prohibition on monopolies in § 2, letters patent for the term of fourteen years or less, of the sole
working or making of any manner of new manufactures, to the true and first inventor).
32. Id. Under the limited exception to the general anti-monopoly rule, the subject of a patent
had to be a “new” manufacture, granted to the “true and first Inventor” thereof, for something which
“others at the tyme of makinge such Lettres Patents . . . shall not use [sic] [.]” Id.
33. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2004) (prescribing and describing novelty requirement,
respectively, in the United States). See also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO AGREEMENT], Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81, art. 27.1 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS AGREEMENT] (requiring of member nations
that their patents be limited to inventions that are “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application”) (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
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hub-and-spoke investment partnership in State Street on the ground that
it was a service and not a “manufacture.” Clever lawyers, however,
would of course argue (as indeed the State Street patentee did)34 that the
programmed computer used to manage the partnership was a
“manufacture,” thereby circumventing the limitation. And indeed, it is
hard to distinguish, on a general and abstract basis, a programmed digital
computer that performs novel functions by virtue of new programming
from other novel machines or manufactures. For these and similar
reasons, attempts at line drawing based on the meanings of words like
“manufacture” or “technology” have generally been fruitless.35
Thomas Jefferson made some progress in line drawing by
recognizing that merely being “new” is not enough. As a prolific
inventor himself and the father of our patent system,36 he insured that
our very first patent statute required patentable inventions, inter alia, to
be “sufficiently useful and important[.]”37 The historical record bears
ample witness to his reasons for doing so: he feared the monopolistic
effect or “embarrassment” of patents if too liberally granted.38
Over time, Jefferson’s verbal formulation evolved successively into
(1) a requirement for more than the skill of an ordinary mechanic,39 (2)
“invention,” meaning an undefined quality of inventiveness,40 and
finally (3) the criterion of nonobviousness that we have today under
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952.41
No apparent substantive change was intended in any of this
semantic evolution.42 Rather, each successive formulation was an
34. See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375-76.
35. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 836-38, 843-46, for further discussion of this point.
36. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966) (describing Jefferson’s
role and attitudes in helping structure our patent system and, as Secretary of State, in serving as one
of three officials who superintended its operation).
37. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790) (allowing any two of Secretary of
State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General to issue patent if they found “the invention or
discovery sufficiently useful and important”) (emphasis added in text).
38. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (noting Jefferson’s recognition of difficulty of “drawing a line
between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and
those which are not” (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813),
reprinted in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, John C.
Riker 1857))).
39. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850).
40. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 11-12 (describing evolution in meaning of term “invention” to
describe, but not resolve, line-drawing problem in interval between Hotchkiss and Patent Act of
1952).
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004) (precluding patent if, inter alia, “the subject matter [of the
invention] as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art”) (emphasis added).
42. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 12-17 (reviewing history of 1952 Act and concluding that it
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attempt to better articulate a criterion for distinguishing innovations that,
although technically new, were not the sort that justified the economic
harm of a state-granted monopoly, albeit for a limited term.
As is apparent from this brief review, however, this semantic
evolution failed to solve the line-drawing problem. In some respects, it
failed even to ask the right question. As Thomas Jefferson apparently
understood, and as our Alice would appreciate, the basic question is an
economic one: which innovations justify the negative social and
economic effects that inevitably flow, according to economic science,
from any monopoly,43 especially one granted and protected by the
awesome power of the State? The more recent historical formulations—
more skill than an ordinary mechanic’s, “invention” (meaning
inventiveness), and nonobviousness—missed the point because they
appeared to focus on the mental qualities and capacity of the inventor
and her leap of imagination. Yet these factors have little to do with the
fundamental economic problem. Thomas Jefferson’s first formulation
“sufficiently useful and important” got the right idea, but it wasn’t very
specific.
In 1966, the Supreme Court, in a seminal decision construing the
meaning of obviousness, finally asked the economically relevant
question. The issue, it said, was how to distinguish innovations that
would not be made but for the incentive of a limited patent monopoly
from those that would be made anyway.44 This important conceptual
breakthrough was vital for economic clarity; it was the first since
Jefferson’s to recognize, at least implicitly, that patents can actually do
economic harm if they are granted when they are not needed. Alice
would undoubtedly appreciate this restatement as a giant step toward
common sense.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence actually
has “taught away” (to use patent jargon) from this beginning of a
solution to the line-drawing problem. Instead of trying to solve the linedrawing problem, that court has largely tried to ignore it, substituting
formalism for probing judgment.45 It has all but ruled that anything
fairly described by one or more of the laundry list of nouns in Section
“was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention”).
43. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 823-25 (discussing several consequences—
principally higher prices, reduced output, and lower innovation, of monopoly as compared to an
equivalent competitive market).
44. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 11 (“The inherent problem was to develop some means of
weeding out those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patent.”).
45. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 876-894, for further discussion of this point.
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10146 is patentable subject matter, regardless of any economic need for
or adverse effect of the patent.47 In relying so heavily on that list of
nouns (which contains the word “manufacture” drawn from the statute of
monopolies)48 the court has reverted to the formalistic, semantic games
that Jefferson had apparently tried to avoid by his more probing
formulation in our very first patent statute. In other words, the Federal
Circuit appears to have foreclosed any substantive inquiry into the
balance between monopoly (which nearly always has a negative
economic effect) and the need for incentives for innovation that justifies
a temporary monopoly.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has all but eliminated the
nonobviousness criterion—the modern successor to Jefferson’s
“sufficiently . . . important” language. It has done so by interpreting that
criterion as requiring “suggestions” in published references49 and
therefore as little more than the separate “novelty” requirement.50 In the
attached article I outline in much more detail precisely how the court has
done so,51 and I won’t repeat that argument here. Suffice it to say that
the FTC, in its White Paper, also concluded that the Federal Circuit’s
“suggestion” test may be anticompetitive and counterproductive without
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (“The repetitive use of the expansive term ‘any’
in § 101 shows Congress’s intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a
patent may be obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526,
1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“Because claim 15 is directed to a ‘machine,’ which is one
of the four categories of patentable subject matter enumerated in § 101, claim 15 appears on its face
to be directed to § 101 subject matter.”). In both cases, the Federal Circuit of course addressed the
judge-made exceptions to patentable subject matter for abstract ideas and laws of nature, but in
reducing them to their narrowest, most literal scope—and in confusing them with a lack of utility—
the court deprived them of all vitality. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 887-891, 890 n.218.
48. See supra note 46 and the text accompanying note 31.
49. See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the
“relevant inquiry” is “whether there is a reason, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art or
elsewhere that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references”); In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (requiring “rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or
motivation to combine prior art references”), rev’d on other grounds. See generally DRATLER,
supra note 1, § 2.03[3][f] (discussing Federal Circuit’s “suggestion test” for obviousness).
50. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 882-83. Under the doctrine of “complete
anticipation,” patent law requires a single prior-art reference to render an invention non-novel. Id.
(discussing doctrine and citing authority). The Federal Circuit’s “suggestion” test for obviousness,
which permits combining more than a single reference but generally requires something explicit in
each, therefore requires little more than novelty as a nonlawyer would understand it, i.e., something
not described in any combination of prior-art references. See id. at 883-85.
51. See id. at 882-91.
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substantial modification.52
Thus, the Federal Circuit, ignoring patent law’s strong foundation
in economics and policy, effectively has read the subject-matter and
nonobviousness requirements out of the patent code. It therefore should
be no surprise that two of the FTC’s key recommendations are to
resurrect the subject-matter inquiry, with due consideration for antitrust
principles,53 and to restore the nonobviousness criterion to at least a
shadow of its former robustness with probing judgment not entirely
dependent on explicit “suggestions” in the prior art.54 Alice would no
doubt applaud these suggestions.
The tragedy of this excessive formalism, which gave us patents like
that in State Street, is that economic theory now provides a much better
basis for answering the question that the Supreme Court posed in
Graham: how to distinguish innovations whose development require the
patent incentive from those that do not. The theory is neither new nor
controversial; it is basic entrepreneurial risk-reward theory.
As I’ve explained in more detail in the attached article,55 the
analysis goes as follows. Risk-reward theory teaches that, in order to
motivate firms to take business risk, we must offer them a potential
reward proportionate to the risk.56 This theory is well-accepted and
noncontroversial; it explains such diverse phenomena as interest rates
for bonds of varying terms, issued by firms with various prospects, and
the relatively high prices of speculative technology stocks. Potential
reward, it says, must bear a direct relationship to the level of risk
undertaken and the chance of failure.
Now, as Alice would recognize, every new business venture has
some risk of failure. A haberdasher takes a risk in expanding its product
line into toiletries. A supermarket or bank takes a risk in building a new
branch in a new suburb or in a formerly blighted inner-city
neighborhood where no such branch currently exists. A funeral home
takes a risk in offering a new program of prepaid funerals with
installment financing. In each of these ventures, there is substantial risk
of consumer nonacceptance, which Alice would call market risk.
Yet we don’t grant patents for these ventures. Rather, we consider
52. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 11-12 (recommending modification of the
“suggestion” test); id. at 9-11 (analyzing deficiencies of test).
53. See id. at 14-15 (recommending consideration of anticompetitive and other harm before
“extending the scope of patentable subject matter”).
54. See supra notes 49-50.
55. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 840-53.
56. See JOHN CRAVEN, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 248 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1984).
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the risk that they undertake to be ordinary business risk. We therefore
subject them to the rigors of free competition and the Sherman Act’s
absolute prohibition against monopolies, derived from the old English
Statute of Monopolies.
With her knowledge of the Statute and her firm belief in its
rightness and balance, Alice would pose a burning question: “What
makes business ventures involving patentable inventions and their
development different from ordinary business ventures that must suffer
the rule of free competition?” To answer this question, she might
consider the paradigmatic patent-driven industry: pharmaceuticals.
Recent figures are startling.57 They suggest that the “fully loaded” cost
of developing a single new pharmaceutical molecule, taking it though
laboratory and clinical trials, and securing FDA approval for its
marketing is today about $800 million58 (including the cost of project
failures).59 Furthermore, fewer than one in five drug candidates that
make it out of the laboratory survive this tortuous process and reach the
marketplace in the form of FDA-approved pharmaceuticals.60
Thus, as drug firms enter the clinical testing phase, they must play a
game of high-stakes roulette. They must ante up several hundred million
dollars for each new drug, and their chances of taking it to market are
one in five. Moreover, their risk is not market risk, i.e., the risk of
consumer nonacceptance. It is a risk that the results of their research
simply will not work, either at all or with enough safety and
effectiveness to satisfy the panels of experts that advise the FDA and
justify marketing to the public. The risk they face is thus not market
57. The most recent industry figures suggest that development costs for a single successful
drug may be as high as $1.7 billion. See Drug Development Costs Rise to $1.7 Billion, Study Finds,
Drug Industry Daily, Dec. 9, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, DRGDLY. This paper,
however, relies on a slightly less recent and accepted independent study by Dr. Joseph A. DiMasi at
Tufts University’s Center for the Study of Drug Development, which put the full cost of drug
development at $800 million. See Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, News Release:
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802
Million (Nov. 30, 2001), at http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6 (last
visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter TUFTS NEWS RELEASE].
58. See TUFTS NEWS RELEASE, supra note 57.
59. See TUFTS NEWS RELEASE, supra note 57. The $800 million figure includes “expenses of
project failures and the impact that long development times have on investment costs.” Id.
60. See Henry Grabowski, Pharmaceuticals: Politics, Policy and availability: Patents and
New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUBLIC
POL’Y REV. 7, 9 (2003) (citing Joseph A. DiMasi, Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical
Testing in the United States, 58 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 1-14 (1995)).
The author stated that, “[t]ypically, many thousands of compounds are examined in the pre-clinical
period for every one that makes it into human testing.” Id. “Only 20 percent of the compounds
entering clinical trials survive the development process and gain FDA approval[.]” Id.
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risk, but technological risk, i.e., the risk that their project will fall
entirely and that they will lose their sunk investment, for reasons other
than market acceptance.61
With the pharmaceutical industry as a paradigm, Alice would
understand the economic rationale for patents.
Without patent
protection, an innovating firm’s rival could copy and market the
innovator’s successful drug without incurring the $800 million cost of
development. Of course, the copyist would have to incur the cost of
building and operating a manufacturing plant, but so does the
innovator.62 Because the copyist can avoid the additional high cost of
innovation, as well as much of the costs of marketing and promotion,63 it
can afford to sell the drug at a lower price than the innovator. Its entry
into the market will either drive the innovator out or prevent the
innovator from recovering its enormous development cost. As other
firms learn these “rules of the game,” they will channel their investment
out of risky innovation and into safe copying. Only patent protection
can make the innovator’s substantial investment in development and
clinical testing economically rational and stem the “flight of capital”
from innovation to copying.64
All this would make eminent sense to innovators seeking to recover
their cost of innovating. The direct, sunk cost of innovation, however, is
only half the story; the other half is risk. Even if a third party (such as
the government) guaranteed to repay the innovator’s development and
clinical-testing expenses for a successful product, Alice would still
wonder whether innovation would be a rational act. The reason is risk.
Since only one in five products succeeds, guaranteeing reimbursement
for the development costs of successful products would not make the
innovator whole. It would still be out the cost of all those products that
failed in the process of development. Only patent protection, with its
61. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 840-51 for further discussion of the distinction
between market and technological risk.
62. The copyist might also have to incur some additional expense to convince the FDA that its
manufacturing process was as safe and reliable as the innovator’s.
63. As long as the law allows the copyist to market its copycat drug, the law should not
prevent it from truly describing that drug as an exact copy. The copyist could even use the
innovator’s trademark to identify its copy (truthfully) as a duplicate of the innovator’s drug. See
DRATLER, supra note 1, § 10.04 (discussing doctrine of trademark fair use). As a result, the copyist
could “free ride” on the innovator’s marketing and promotion expenses, as well as on its
development and clinical-testing costs.
64. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 842-43. See also Grabowski, supra note 60, at 11
(“Without a well-structured system of global patent protection, neither the research pharmaceutical
industry nor the generic industry would be able to grow and prosper, and the rate of new product
introductions and patent expirations would decline significantly.”).
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potentially unlimited reward arising out of exclusive rights in successful
innovation, can provide a potential reward high enough to justify this
risk.65
Alice therefore would see two key economic issues that patents in
patent-driven industries address: (1) recoupment of the innovator’s sunk
costs of innovation, and (2) compensation for the risk that development
will be unsuccessful and that those sunk costs will be a total loss.
Moreover, patent-driven industries differ in the nature of that risk from
other business ventures: the risk that they take is a risk of total loss for
reasons other than market acceptance.
As this example of the pharmaceutical industry shows, patentdriven industries have an important characteristic that ordinary business
ventures do not share. They incur substantial development costs, and
those costs are at risk of total loss for technological reasons, i.e., for
reasons other than market or consumer acceptance. With her
theoretical and economic bent, Alice would be sure that this vital
difference is something any rational patent system should recognize and
reflect.
With further thought, Alice might conclude that this point—
substantial development cost at nonmarket risk of total failure—serves
as a useful economic criterion for patentable subject matter.66 As such, it
has three key advantages over previous tests. First, it addresses directly
the relevant and probing economic question that the Supreme Court
asked in Graham: what innovations require the incentive of patent
protection? Second, it relies not on mere abstractions, but on wellunderstood economic theory with visible, common-sense application in
the real world.67 Finally, it avoids the semantic line-drawing and empty
formalism that attends trying to determine what is a “manufacture” or
what is “technology.” For the risk criterion depends not upon the nature,
function or operation of the invention, but on the nature of the economic
risk, if any, incurred in developing it.
Alice might wonder what would change if the PTO and the courts
65. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 843-53, for further discussion of this point. See
also 1 DRATLER, supra note 2, § 3.02[1] (discussing exclusive rights and running royalties as means
to extract potentially unlimited reward from marketplace and thereby to justify unknown and
unknowable development risk).
66. See also DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 844-53.
67. See supra notes 57, 60. Real economic risk can be demonstrated by such evidence as
expert testimony, historical and statistical records of similar projects, and the record in the actual
development project at issue, including false starts, blind alleys, and development and/or testing
expense incurred without tangible result. In other words, courts can rely on exactly the same sort of
evidence compiled in studies such as those cited in notes 57 and 60. Id.
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applied this common-sense criterion for patentable subject matter. After
reflection, she would no doubt conclude that much in our present patent
system would change.
First and foremost, the troublesome
nonobviousness criterion would not be necessary and could be dispensed
with. After all, that criterion, properly understood, is historically and
functionally just a proxy for proper subject matter.68 As the Graham
Court recognized, it is aimed at distinguishing inventions that justify, in
Jefferson’s words, the “embarrassment of an exclusive patent” from
those that do not. By solving the subject-matter line-drawing problem
based on actual economic effect, not formalism, the nonmarket-risk-oftotal-failure criterion would obviate the need for nonobviousness
determinations, with all their abstract legal hairsplitting.
The risk criterion also would simplify patent litigation in yet
another respect. By focusing on economic and business matters like
sunk investment and risk of failure, it would relieve one of the most
troublesome sources of judicial chagrin and error in patent cases: most
judges’ lack of familiarity with science and technology.69 No longer
would judges without technical backgrounds have to understand the
underlying technology sufficiently to judge whether an alleged
innovation involves a concrete invention, on the one hand, or a “law of
nature” or “abstract idea” on the other.70 Instead, they would have only
to understand enough to evaluate the credibility and weight of expert
testimony whether there was real nonmarket risk of total failure and loss
when the development project began. The result would be to make
patent law much less of an obscure field dependent on the intricacies of
technical specialties, and much more a field of economic law accessible
to legally-trained minds with some understanding of business and
economics. If nothing else, such a change would both reflect and assist
patent law’s increasing importance in the new global economic order.
Of course, this criterion would reduce the number of patents
granted and upheld, perhaps by a considerable margin. No longer would
the PTO issue new patents, for example, for hundreds of variations of
68. See supra text accompanying ns. 35-45.
69. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). No less a
distinguished figure in American jurisprudence than Judge (later Justice) Story lamented that
“[p]atents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic
discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least
may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.” Id. at 344.
70. These are two of the three (themselves abstract) terms that define the traditional judgemade exceptions to patentable subject matter. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)
(“Excluded from . . . patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”)
(citations omitted).

DRATLER1.DOC

2005]

3/11/2005 11:25 AM

ALICE IN WONDERLAND

317

circuit breakers distinguished from each other only through the use of
slightly different semiconductors (invented by others) or slightly
different circuitry.
Minor improvements of patented inventions,
developed in projects with little risk of failure, would be unpatentable no
matter how “nonobvious” their methods of operation might seem, in the
abstract, to judge or jury after the fact.
This change, however, would not remove the present patent
statute’s salubrious prohibition against hindsight.71 Rather, it would
require the risk of failure to be assessed as of the beginning of a research
or development project, not after its successful conclusion.
This change might, however, require reassessment of the sentence
in current Section 103 that precludes considering how an invention was
made.72 If an invention’s manner of making entails no real economic
risk—for example, if a mechanical device, conceived in a sudden
inspiration, works the first time it is built—then there is no reason to
provide a patent monopoly. No matter how brilliant the conception,
there is nothing economically to distinguish such an invention from any
ordinary business project, such as opening a branch of a bank or
supermarket in a new neighborhood. The new criterion would, however,
still allow some results of serendipity to be patented. For example,
Charles Goodyear’s fortuitous discovery of how to vulcanize rubber
would probably still be patentable because it took a lot of work, and
involved a lot of economic risk, to turn the lump of goo on his stove into
a commercially viable process for making rubber tires.
If Alice read the well-known decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,
Inc.,73 she might wonder whether the court focused on the right
economic issue. As virtually every patent lawyer knows, the Supreme
Court in Pfaff addressed the application of the one-year statutory “on
sale” bar under Section 102(b) of the patent act.74 It affirmed a holding
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004) (precluding patent if invention “would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art”) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the effect of this statutory phrase in precluding invalidation of patents by
hindsight, see 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.03[3][a].
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2004) (“Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.”).
73. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998). See also DRATLER, supra note 1, at §
2.03[1][b][ii].
74. 35 U.S.C. § 102:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
***
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States[.]
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that the patent was invalid because the invention at issue—a socket for
electronic components—had been placed on sale before the critical date,
even though it had not then been reduced to practice.75 But Alice might
wonder why the case ever got to that point. Shouldn’t courts, she might
ask, logically address the most fundamental issues first? And isn’t the
most fundamental issue whether the claimed invention is patentable
subject matter, i.e., whether it is the type of innovation for which a
patent monopoly is economically justified?
As Alice looked at the simple socket at issue in Pfaff, she would
have grave doubts whether its development entailed the sort of nonmarket risk of total failure that justifies a state-granted monopoly. She
would note that the purported inventor, in testimony reproduced in a
footnote, described a business in which he routinely cranked out such
sockets by making drawings, ordering tooling, and beginning
production, without so much as developing a prototype, and apparently
without any experimentation at all.76 She might laugh at the inventor’s
own description of his production process as “Boom-Boom.”77 Alice
would scratch her head, wondering how a business that routinely
cranked out socked after socket “Boom-Boom” could claim the
technological risk that is the raison d’etre of patent protection.
As the Pfaff case so well illustrates, computer-program and
business-method patents are not the sole examples of patent protection
that makes little economic sense. As Alice studied the U.S. patent
system in greater detail, she would no doubt come across many patents
that seemed less validations of meritorious undertaking of technological
risk and more gratuitous exemptions from the general rule of the Statute
of Monopolies: that economies work best when private businesses
compete fairly and freely.
As for theory, Alice would no doubt view the long history and
evolution of what is now the “nonobvious” criterion with disappointed
bemusement. With her training in logic, she would recognize right away
that that criterion was supposed from the beginning to serve as a proxy
for valid subject matter, separate and apart from the criterion of novelty
that has been part of every patent statute since the Statute of
Monopolies. She would scratch her head in wonderment at the notion
that anyone would choose “nonobviousness” as an economic test. What
does cognitional difficulty, she would ask, have to do with any relevant
Id. (emphasis added).
75. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66, 68-69.
76. See id. at 58 n.3.
77. See id.
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economic factor? And aren’t mental and cognitional criteria, like state
of mind, the hardest things to measure and prove in practice? Wouldn’t
it make much more sense, she might think, to focus on the technological
risk that entrepreneurs take in developing their innovations—something
that has direct economic relevance and can be measured and proven by
normal economic and evidentiary techniques?
Reviewing the history of this subject-matter proxy, Alice would
probably see the Hotchkiss decision in 185178 as a tragically missed
opportunity. If only the Court had changed one word, from the “skill”
an ordinary mechanic79 to the “risk” assumed by an ordinary mechanic,
she might think, it might have advanced the cause of economically
rational patent law by more than a century.
III. THE BREADTH OF CLAIMS
The second most important question that our Alice would address,
after distinguishing inventions for which patent monopolies are
economically beneficial from those for which it is not, would involve the
breadth of a patent’s claims. Once an invention is proved worthy of an
exception from the general rule of free competition in business, Alice
would ask, how much does or should the patent on it cover?
Unfortunately, the FTC’s White Paper does not directly address this
issue, although it has been historically one of the most contentious in our
patent law.
Current patent law addresses this line-drawing problem under two
separate doctrines, which—at least to some extent—pull in different
directions. The first doctrine is essentially a rule of invalidation. If the
claims are too broad for the specification, i.e., if they are not supported
by the drawings and detailed description in the patent (apart from the
claims),80 the claims are invalid.81 This “claim only what you’ve
disclosed” doctrine technically involves four different types of
78. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267.
79. See id. (stating that “unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method . . . were
required in the application of it [in the claimed invention] than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business,” the invention was not patentable.). Id.
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004). The statute defines the “specification” as the patent narrative
including the claims. Id. (stating that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more
claims . . .”) (emphasis added). Yet both practitioners and courts are in the habit of referring to the
“specification” as the part of the patent other than the claims, especially the narrative description of
the invention and the drawings.
81. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1] (discussing four different legal disclosure
requirements—enablement, best mode, written description, and definiteness—and the rule that
failure to satisfy any one invalidates the patent).
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disclosure—enablement, best mode, written description, and
definiteness82—but for economic purposes we can lump them together.
As long as the disclosure adequately supports the claims made, the
second doctrine comes into play. The doctrine of equivalents broadens
the reach of the claims to “equivalents” of what they literally describe.83
The Federal Circuit disfavors the notion that this doctrine “broadens” the
claims, but that is the effect of what it does.84 It allows a patentee that
cannot claim literal infringement to win an infringement suit although
the patent’s claims do not literally describe what the defendant does.85
A. What is the Problem?
After reflection, our Alice would no doubt find this two-doctrine
system quite odd, especially from an economic perspective. Of course a
patentee has every incentive to draft claims as broadly as possible, since
the claims determine the scope of the legal monopoly that the patent
provides.86 But the courts have no power or method to contain the
results of that incentive by narrowing the claims.87 A court can only
invalidate claims or validate them and (under the doctrine of
equivalents) extend them. Patent examiners have some power to narrow
claims by rejecting and renegotiating their scope in the course of patent

82. See id. See also id. § 2.04[1][a], [b], [d], [f] (discussing each disclosure requirement
separately and citing authority).
83. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-29 (1997)
(reconfirming vitality of doctrine of equivalents against challenges based on Patent Act of 1952);
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (stating that an accused
device is equivalent to the claimed invention “if it performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters,
280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929))); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 334 (1854) (providing the
seminal decision on doctrine of equivalents).
84. See Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“As we recently acknowledged in Streamfeeder, the doctrine of equivalents does not operate
to ‘broaden’ claims, but rather broadens the right to exclude. For the sake of convenience, however,
we will likewise use these terms here, ‘cognizant of the fact that it is the right to exclude which is
being expanded, not the claims.’” (quoting Streamfeeder, LLC v. Mailing Mach. Serv., Inc., 175
F.3d 974, 981 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Of course applying the doctrine of equivalents does not
literally rewrite the claims, but it does give them the practical effect of claims, hypothetical or
otherwise, with broader scope than their literal language commands.
85. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][b][i] (discussing doctrine of equivalents in
depth).
86. See id. § 2.05[3][a] (introduction), [i] (discussing claims as determining scope of patent
monopoly).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2004). The patentee can narrow the claims in reissue, if excessive
breadth was due to “error without any deceptive intention[.]” Id. The courts, however, have no
power to narrow the claims at all.
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prosecution88 but, once a patent issues, courts do not have that option.
Under the current patent system, courts thus have no legal basis for
making a truly independent judgment about what the patentee actually
invented and how far that invention extends. When they construe the
claims, they are stuck with what the patentee wrote and may only
invalidate or accept it.89 When they apply the claims, courts can expand
their application under the doctrine of equivalents, but they cannot
narrow them. Thus, courts have only the Hobson’s choice of approving
an overbroad claim or invalidating it.
Alice would find this Hobson’s choice quite odd. It precludes
courts from making an independent judgment on what appears, from an
economic point of view, to be one of the most important questions for
any patent: what did the inventor contribute to the art and how far did
her contribution extend?
The seminal case of O’Reilly v. Morse90 is a good example. Morse,
who invented the telegraph, drafted and got the PTO to grant an eighth
claim covering every means of using electromagnetism for
telecommunication.91 Of course, he hadn’t invented every means; he
had only invented the telegraph. The Supreme Court invalidated this
claim on the ground that it was simply too broad,92 and of course it was
right in so doing. Morse’s eighth claim would have covered, among
other things, telephone, radio, television, microwave, wireless, and
Internet communication, although they were all invented by others much
later.
The Federal Circuit has interpreted Morse as based on an
inadequate disclosure: Morse didn’t disclose all means of
telecommunicating by electromagnetic energy in his patent.93 But

88. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 1.06[1] (describing patent prosecution procedure).
The Patent and Trademark Office may also narrow claims in re-examination, after a patent has
issued, but that process requires an external request or sua sponte action by the Office and is subject
to judicial review. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-318 (2004).
89. See id. Courts can and do interpret the claims, but they are bound by the claim language,
for the present system puts the burden of describing the legal limits of the invention on the patent
applicant, aided by the patent examiner. See also id. at § 2.05[3][a] (discussing rules and
procedures by which courts construe patent claims in litigation).
90. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
91. See id. at 112 (reciting eighth claim).
92. See id. at 113 (stating that the “court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not
warranted by law”).
93. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714-715 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also id. at 714 (stating that
“the claim is properly rejected for what used to be known as ‘undue breadth,’ but has since been
appreciated as being, more accurately, based on the first paragraph of § 112[,]” i.e., lack of an
enabling and definite disclosure).
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Morse did disclose one means—the telegraph—and it is black-letter
patent law that a patent need not disclose every means of achieving the
ends of every claim.94 Cases are legion that allow inventors to claim
more than their incomplete disclosures would literally warrant.95 If
every patentee didn’t have that right, claims would be even more prolix
than they are today—for they would have to describe explicitly all the
many embodiments of a broad claim—and patents would be much easier
to circumvent.96
So it is no answer to say that Morse didn’t specifically disclose all
the other means of telecommunication using electromagnetism. Even
modern patent practice would not have required him to disclose every
possible embodiment of his invention. The real question is a much
deeper one, which goes far beyond mere formalism: whether the
invention that Morse made, considered in all of its inventiveness and all
of its detail, truly encompassed all of the other modes of using
electromagnetism for telecommunicating that followed.
That is
inevitably a question of judgment, requiring deep understanding of the
patented advance, the pre-existing state of the art, and the extent of the
advance over it. In other words, it is a question for experts versed in the
relevant field of technology. Answering it can never be a matter of mere
formalism, such as that involved in comparing a disclosure with the
claims. Attempting to reduce it to formalism merely avoids the deeper
issue.
For purposes of enablement,97 at least, the Federal Circuit has
developed a legal standard to determine whether a disclosure in the

94. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][b] (describing cases in which scope of
claims may extend beyond what patent literally discloses).
95. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (stating disclosure of “numerous salts, fuels, and emulsifiers that could form thousands of
emulsions” useful as blasting agents was enabling, even if some candidates were inoperative, where
those skilled in art would know how to select components); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502 n.2
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (validating claims for genus consisting of “thousands” of catalysts of similar
chemical formulation, where patent applicant had tested only forty of them, and “some” had not
worked); Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 871, 875-876 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973) (holding patent on catalytic process covered polymerization of
polypropylene, although polypropylene was not mentioned in specification).
96. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, 2.04[1][a], [b] (discussing these rationales for the law’s
flexible disclosure requirements).
97. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. One of the four statutory disclosure
requirements is that the patent specification “enable any person skilled in the art to which [the
patented invention] pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use [it].” 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2004). This is known as the “enablement” requirement, or the requirement for an
“enabling disclosure.” See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1][a].
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patent specification adequately supports the claims.98 The touchstone of
that standard is whether verifying that undisclosed but claimed variants
would work as claimed requires “undue experimentation.”99
From an economic standpoint, however, Alice would think that this
distinction between disclosed embodiments and claims misses the point.
The reason is that the general question of overbreadth involves two
entirely separate sets of issues. A first set addresses, inter alia, whether
the claims and specification adequately describe how to duplicate the
invention and adequately warn potential infringers what they can and
cannot lawfully do.100 That set is adequately covered by the enablement,
definiteness, and other aspects of patent disclosure.101
But Alice would see a second set of overbreadth issues as much
more important from an economic standpoint. It implicates a much
deeper question: how much coverage should a patent give a legitimate
inventor who properly discloses what his invention is and how it works?
Provide too little coverage and patents can be circumventable and
therefore become devalued or worthless. Provide too much and you will
thwart further progress in technology, as well as “inventing around,” and
the patentee will receive a windfall. Although the doctrine of
equivalents at least recognizes the economic problem,102 the Federal
Circuit apart from that doctrine appears to have studiously avoided
answering the second question and appears to maintain that American
patent law does not require it to do so.103
98. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1][a].
99. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing factors to be considered
in determining whether experimentation is undue); Ex parte Jackson, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804, 807
(Board of Patent Appeals Nov. 12, 1982) (explaining rule of reason).
100. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1][b]. The “definiteness” requirement for claiming
boils down to describing the invention definitely in order to allow proper patent prosecution and to
warn putative infringers precisely what they can and cannot do. Id.
101. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
102. Strong dissents and the majority opinions in each of two seminal cases recognized the
tension—inherent in the doctrine of equivalents—between precision in claiming and avoiding
circumvention of the claims through literalism. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 613-614 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that doctrine of equivalents
obviates statutory requirement for distinct claiming); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330,
347 (1854) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (arguing that doctrine of equivalents would undermine
statutory requirement that patent applicant “particularly specify and point out what he claims as his
invention”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 n.3 (1997) (noting that the Court’s majorities in both Graver and
Winans approved doctrine of equivalents despite tension argued in both dissents).
103. See supra note 93 and text accompanying notes 92-93. The Federal Circuit has
recognized only the formal question: whether what the inventor has disclosed supports his claims.
Id. It appears to have refused to address the deeper substantive question: the extent of the inventor’s
contribution to the art, as reflected in the claims and the specification.
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To some extent, the history of American patent law bears out its
view. Before the mid-nineteenth century, American patent law used socalled “central claiming,” in which the inventor described what her
invention was and it was up to the courts to determine the breadth of
coverage.104
Later American law adopted so-called “peripheral
claiming,” under which a patent’s claims are supposed not only to
describe what the invention is, but to convey exactly how it differs from
the “prior art” and therefore the extent of legal protection warranted.105
Almost from the beginning, however, the courts saw this aspect of
peripheral claiming as a trap for the unwary patentee. A patent’s
peripheral claims might be circumvented by avoiding their literal
language but nevertheless taking the essence of the patentee’s invention.
To avoid this result, the courts used the doctrine of equivalents, which
allows patents to cover more than just what the claims’ literal language
describes.106
Yet the doctrine of equivalents has proved to be just as slippery as
the notion of central claiming ever had been. As dissents in two seminal
cases argued,107 the doctrine undermined the very notion of certainty that
peripheral claiming was supposed to promote. So, dissatisfied with the
expansiveness and uncertainty of the doctrine of equivalents, the courts
invented prosecution history estoppel to ameliorate its uncertainty.108
Recently, in Festo, the Federal Circuit attempted to convert that doctrine
into a largely formal process, based upon claim amendments, only to be
rebuffed by the Supreme Court.109
We are now left with a process of determining the breadth of patent
104. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565-1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting) (outlining history of central and peripheral claiming in
discussing history of doctrine of equivalents), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
105. See id.
106. See id. Courts had developed the doctrine of equivalents even before the transition to
peripheral claiming. See id. That transition, however, made the doctrine even more important in
avoiding circumvention of patents, because the formality of peripheral claiming lent itself to
literalism. See id. Thus, despite the argument—reasonable as a matter of history but not
substance—that peripheral claiming was intended to avoid the very sort of uncertainty that the
doctrine created, the Supreme Court has thrice upheld the doctrine of equivalents under the newer
peripheral-claiming regime. See supra notes 83, 102.
107. See supra note 102.
108. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][b][i][B], 2.06[2]. Prosecution history estoppel
attempts to cabin the doctrine of equivalents by holding patent applicants to claim-narrowing
amendments and statements made in the course of patent prosecution. Id.
109. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563, 569 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (barring application of doctrine of equivalents to any claim element narrowed
by amendment in course of patent prosecution), rev’d, 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002) (rejecting complete
bar in favor of more flexible, case-by-case approach).
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protection that Alice could only describe as byzantine. For each
patent—no matter how trivial, how unlikely to be litigated, and how
unlikely to be used or infringed—we insist that the inventor incur the
enormous expense of describing the invention in great detail and
precision (usually with the aid of expensive counsel) in patent claims,
distinguishing those claims from the entire universe of prior art, arguing
with the examiner, and (upon occasion) appealing disputes through the
PTO and on up through the courts. Then, when and if the patent claims
are litigated, we take a completely fresh, second look at whether what
the patentee described supports the claims, on pain of invalidating them
(which may require a second trip to the courts). Once we’ve determined
that the claims are properly supported by the expensive description so
obtained—and therefore valid—we then construe them, often in separate
Markman hearings,110 because, despite all the effort at precise formalism
in the drafting and prosecution process, we really don’t necessarily know
what they mean after all. Finally, once we’ve determined what they
mean literally, we have to apply them. In that process, we must
determine not only what they mean literally, but what they mean
equivalently, and whether coverage of equivalents has been abandoned
through estoppel.
As a rational and logical being, not having invested years in
learning and exploiting this byzantine and extravagantly inefficient
system, Alice might be excused for concluding that it had been designed
by a madman. More cynically, she might conclude that a cadre of
lawyers had designed it, intent on sucking the well springs of innovation
dry with fees. Certainly no rational economist, conscious of the
enormous transaction costs and delay of patent prosecution, licensing
and litigation—and the chances for multiplication of error at every
stage—would propose such a system if designing new patent laws from
scratch. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a less efficient system more
prone to error.
B. What Should We Do Now?
So what might Alice recommend we do now? Three things come to
110. A Markman hearing is named for the seminal case that made claim construction a task for
judges, not juries. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)
(unanimous decision) (stating “[w]e hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art
within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”). Because courts exclusively
construe claims, they may decide, at the parties’ request or sua sponte, to determine the meaning of
claims in separate hearings, which may occasion separate appeals. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, §
2.05[3][a][iv].
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mind. First and foremost, Alice might suggest that we stop pretending
that assessing the breadth of an inventor’s contribution to technology can
ever be made an entirely formal, mechanical or literal process. Futile
attempts to create an effective formalism so far have produced only 150
years of increasing complexity in law and practice, plus transaction costs
no doubt measurable in the trillions of dollars.
Before the Markman decision and its progeny, expert witnesses
used to help judges without technical training to understand enough of
the complex technologies at issue to make good patent decisions. The
rule against “extrinsic evidence” in construing patent claims111—a direct
descendant of Markman112—virtually eliminated that testimony in claim
construction.113 As a matter of policy, Judge Newman and others were
quite right to lament its passing.114
But Alice would view the demise of expert testimony as a direct
consequence of a patently ridiculous fiction: the notion that inventors
can describe the essence of their contributions in such literal,
unmistakable language that anyone, including people without any
technical training whatsoever, can not only understand those cutting
edge contributions, but also see clearly their precise limitations with
respect to prior art. Alice also would consider our current extravagantly
wasteful and byzantine system a direct consequence of a further policy
choice. Why, she would ask, must all inventors incur the enormous cost
(in time and money) of reducing their inexpressible cutting-edge
advances to this supposedly unmistakable language, whether or not
anyone will ever use their inventions and whether or not their patent will
ever be disputed?
111. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic evidence, constitute the
public record of the patentee’s claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely. In
other words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established
rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and,
thus, design around the claimed invention . . . . Allowing the public record to be altered
or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would
make this right meaningless.
Id. at 1583 (Citations omitted).
112. See also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451, 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (en banc) (confirming that even issues of technical definition of terms used in claiming are
matters of claim construction and therefore matters of law, not subject to deferential review on
appeal, and confirming importance of intrinsic evidence expressed in Vitronics).
113. See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.05[3][a][iii] (discussing decisions cited in
Vitronics and Cybor Corp., their derivation from Markman, their effect in eliminating expert
testimony from claim construction, and the dissenting views of several judges on this point).
114. See, e.g., Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1480 (stating the additional views of Judges Newman
and Meyer); id. at 1475 (stating the dissenting views of Judges Rader and Newman).
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Perhaps, Alice might suggest, there is a simpler, more efficient
alternative. Suppose an inventor could get a real patent, not just a
provisional patent,115 simply by filing a description of his or her
invention, without claims. Suppose further that the law required a
complete disclosure, as it does today, i.e., one that is enabling and
definite, shows possession of the invention, and reveals the “best
mode.”116 Suppose further that the law encouraged, if not required, the
inventor to submit to the PTO relevant computerized files (logic
diagrams, gene sequences, calculations, simulations, experimental data,
etc.) describing the invention and its limits, to be published only after
eighteen months (or, if earlier, after patent issuance or a bona-fide
dispute requiring them). Next suppose that the inventor would not have
to draft stylized, legalistic claims, but would simply describe the
problem, if any, solved by the invention and how it worked (and, if
relevant, how it was made), in ordinary, technical language. How would
this approach change the economics of our current patent system?
At the outset, this approach would eliminate a major economic
inefficiency of our current patent system: the fact that it requires every
patentee—regardless of the importance of his invention or whether it
will ever be disputed—to incur the enormous expense of attempting to
reduce the solution of a complex problem at the forefront of technology
to “bulletproof” stylized legal language.
The FTC also has
recommended reducing this expense,117 but its recommendations—
chiefly for post-grant inter partes review118—only apply to disputed
patents and simply shift more business and more fees to another yet
additional layer of procedure in this already overloaded system.
A more rational and effective approach might be to recognize that
gauging the proper breadth of a patent is always a matter of
understanding and judgment and can never be made a purely formal and
mechanical process. Such an approach also might recognize an essential
fact of life that patent lawyers and judges seem reluctant to
acknowledge: a generalist lawyer or judge can never hope to achieve the
same understanding of cutting-edge technology (let alone in a few days
or weeks of litigation!) that the scientists and engineers who developed it
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b). Present law allows an inventor to get a provisional patent, good
for one year only, by filing an application without claims. See also 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, §
1.06[1].
116. See 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.04[1]. These are the four disclosure requirements of
today’s patent law in the United States. Id.
117. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 11-12, 17-24 (discussing proposals for expanded
post-grant inter partes review).
118. See id. at 7-8.
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obtained through a lifetime of study and effort. All generalists can hope
to do is see through a glass darkly, with foreseeable consequences for
the technological and economic validity of their decisions. Therefore,
Alice might conclude, a more rational approach might encourage the
courts and other tribunals to make a single judgment, based on the patent
disclosure alone, without claims, whether an alleged infringer took what
the patentee invented. This approach would involve liberal use of expert
testimony, including, where necessary, experts appointed and paid by the
court and therefore presumed to be impartial.119 This approach is not
nearly as radical as it sounds: it is precisely the approach that courts took
before the switch to peripheral claiming led, in the vain search for
formal certainty, to the current byzantine system.
A second approach to simplifying our current terminally byzantine
system would be to focus on how inventions are made and used in the
real world. Present patent doctrine as exemplified in the doctrine of
equivalents, focuses primarily on an invention’s function, means and
result.120 Under black-letter patent law, however, function alone cannot
be patented,121 so that leaves means and result for assessment. Since
result also cannot be patented separately,122 Alice would no doubt see
the primary focus of existing law as on the means that the inventor used
to accomplish the desired result.
In this regard, a peculiarity of the patent system would sorely
puzzle Alice. That system often neglects or underemphasizes the
economic, commercial, scientific or engineering motivation for the
development, i.e., the end to which the means is directed. In other
words, the patent system, unlike virtually every scientist or engineer that
ever lived, now ignores the problem to be solved.
To be sure, not every invention solves a particular problem. The
laser, for example, was not developed to solve any stated problem, but to
provide a useful source of coherent light, as earlier experiments had
suggested could be done. Yet many, if not most, inventions in industry
arise out of research commissioned to solve a particular problem,
develop a particular product, or fill a specified need. Forcing inventors
to disclose the end (if any) to which their inventions are directed would
119. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (permitting court to appoint experts of its own selection or
agreed to by parties).
120. See supra note 83.
121. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938). See also 1 DRATLER, supra note
1, § 2.05[3][c][i] (discussing these cases).
122. A patent on a result without the means to achieve it would provide nothing useful to the
public.
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assist in interpreting patents and determining whether they are infringed.
Just as using a different means to solve the same problem is ordinarily
not infringement,123 so using a similar means to solve a different
problem might not be infringement, at least from an economic
perspective, because verifying its ability to do so might still involve a
significant risk of total failure. And, as we have seen, it is risk of total
failure (for nonmarket reasons) that provides the sole rational economic
justification for the patent system.
Another benefit of requiring disclosure of the problem to be solved
would be reducing the flood of patents on inventions of no real value,
which firms procure solely for legal or other strategic business
reasons.124 The FTC White Paper discusses what everyone who works
with patents has long known: that many issue for such economically
wasteful reasons as threatening or intimidating competitors, bulking up
patent portfolios for threats or cross-licensing, or additional security in
case of future disputes.125
Requiring inventors to disclose the
technological, economic, or other real-world problem, if any, that their
invention solved would help reveal these patents for what they are and
encourage courts to narrow their application appropriately. With the
help of expert testimony, courts should not have much difficulty
distinguishing cases in which no problem is cited for these reasons from
those in which an invention, like the laser, has multiple unforeseen uses
and should be treated as pioneering.
In the end, Alice would no doubt dwell at length on a third and
most important suggestion for solving the patent-breadth line-drawing
problem: focusing less on formalism and more on substantial economic
effect. As she compared American patent law to American antitrust law,
the relative backwardness of patent law in this respect would puzzle
Alice. Hadn’t the United States Supreme Court, as early as 1977,
decreed that decisions in antitrust law should turn on economics, not

123. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898)
(enunciating “reverse doctrine of equivalents,” under which device that performs same function to
achieve same result by substantially different means than patented invention does not infringe, even
if described literally by patent’s claims); SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (same). See generally 1 DRATLER, supra note 1, § 2.06[3] (discussing reverse
doctrine of equivalents).
124. See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 6-7 (executive summary) (recognizing the same
problem and discussing negative impact of “thicket” of patents on computer industry). See also id.
at 27-36 (discussing transaction costs and strategic impediments to follow-on innovation resulting
from multiple patents).
125. See id. at 34-43 (discussing computer industries); id. at 51-56 (discussing software and
Internet industries).
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formalism?126 Alice would ponder why the same salubrious principle
had not found its way into American patent law, despite the fact that
patent and antitrust are but two sides of the very same coin of economic
law.
One way to weigh economic substance more than formalism, Alice
might suggest, would be to focus on the economic considerations that
make the invention patentable. As discussed above, the key factor is the
risk of total failure and loss of investment that the development process
overcame. Once a court knows the problem to be solved and the nature
and outcome of that development process, it should not be too difficult
for the court to determine whether the alleged infringer has taken the
result of that development process without compensation—that is, has
taken what made the development risky in the first place—thereby
undermining the incentive to undertake the risk, or whether the alleged
infringer, although engaged in similar activities, has not appropriated the
benefits or results of the patentee’s research to itself.
Perhaps these suggestions sound simple and obvious. Yet adopting
them in legislation would make a radical departure from the current
system, based as it is in large measure on formalism and economic
irrelevancies (such as whether or not the invention would have been
“obvious” to a person of ordinary skill). As far back as 1977, with its
groundbreaking decision in GTE Sylvania,127 the Supreme Court decided
that antitrust law should turn on substantial economic effect, not barren
formalism. Isn’t it high time, Alice would wonder, that Congress or the
courts make a similar decree in patent law?
IV. CONCLUSION: PROS AND CONS OF THE FTC’S WHITE PAPER
After studying our patent system for some time, Alice would no
doubt conclude that, while vital to our economic well being and laudable
in principle and purpose, our patent system is fundamentally flawed in
both theory and practice. She would likely view the vain search for an
effective formalism that began with the transition to peripheral claiming
126. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (stating “departure
from the rule-of-reason standard [in antitrust law] must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”). See also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-726 (1988) (reiterating twice the preference for considering substantial
economic effect, rather than formalism).
127. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) (stating “departure
from the rule-of-reason standard [in antitrust law] must be based upon demonstrable economic
effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”). See also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-726 (1988) (reiterating twice the preference for considering substantial
economic effect, rather than formalism).

DRATLER1.DOC

2005]

3/11/2005 11:25 AM

ALICE IN WONDERLAND

331

in the nineteenth century as an abject failure. It has complicated, she
would think, the processes of examining, prosecuting, interpreting and
litigating patents immeasurably. It has also permitted and indeed
encouraged a flood of patents on essentially worthless “me too” and
other noninventions, put forward only for legally strategic purposes. At
the same time, by treating all things “novel” essentially alike, without
considering the investment and risk involved in developing them or their
general economic importance in the larger scheme of science and
technology, it has sometimes obscured the value of and permitted
circumvention of patents on fundamental, pioneering inventions.
Alice would hardly see these defects as the current system’s only
flaws. She would note the obsessive quest for precise formal
descriptions of inventions that may never be tested. Then she would
wonder why it has been allowed to raise the transaction costs of patent
searches, infringement opinions, patent prosecution, patent litigation and
technology management to the point where they are a significant drag on
industry—perhaps so much so that the cost occasionally overwhelms the
benefits of innovation that this system encourages. And she would
wonder why the present system has forced lay judges and juries to
immerse themselves in the entrails of technological specialties and
esoteric semantic disputes far more than they need to do in order to
understand the economic impact of innovation and patents and make
good decisions based on real and substantial economic effect. As Alice
reviewed all these shortcomings, she might well come to believe that
patent claim prosecution, amendment, construction, and interpretation
have become an inordinately expensive and irrelevant semantic game
that is neither necessary to the healthy functioning of a patent system nor
desirable for our (or any) economy.
What, then, might Alice think of the FTC’s white paper? First of
all, she would vigorously applaud the FTC for undertaking this project.
Applause, she would think, is especially due because of the timing of the
FTC’s effort. We live at a time in our political history when antitrust
law is “on the ropes,” while our legal and political institutions
concentrate on getting back to business as usual after the bubble,
recession and scandals of recent years. By undertaking this project, the
FTC has underscored what everyone who has eyes to see and ears to
hear now knows: something is seriously wrong with our patent system.
If it had done nothing else, the FTC would have made a substantial
contribution just by making this point.
A second point on which Alice might praise the FTC is its
collecting, through its hearings, a factual record underscoring what is
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wrong with our patent system. It is one thing for naïfs like Alice or
academics like me to criticize developments from our ivory tower. It is
quite another to note that the very people who use and are often abused
by the patent system are beginning to notice that it is often
counterproductive in practice. The FTC has done our country a great
service by showing that criticism of the system does not come solely
from academic purists.
Alice might also praise the FTC for its fourteen recommendations
(if you count the subheads).128 Each of them, if adopted, would move
our system in a better direction.
The main difficulty that Alice would perceive, however, is that the
FTC’s recommendations do not go nearly far enough. There are three
respects in which the White Paper fails to demonstrate how
wrongheaded and economically counterproductive certain modern trends
in patent law may be.
First, by providing such a long laundry list of recommendations, the
FTC risks hiding the wheat in the chaff. Such things as providing a new
procedure for post-grant opposition129 and changing the burden of proof
to invalidate patents (from clear and convincing evidence to a
preponderance)130 may do something to reduce the economic impact of
bad patents. But these expedients will do little to close the floodgates of
litigation or to reduce the flood of patent applications that produces bad
patents. Indeed, in the short run, they may actually increase the flood of
litigation and transactions costs that is threatening to swamp genuine
innovative industry.
Alice might well view enacting these
recommendations alone as doing little more than rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic.
There is a second respect in which Alice might view the FTC White
Paper as understating the need for reform. It buries its most important
suggestions in the middle of the long list of fourteen. By far the most
important, as Alice might see it, is the suggestion that the courts consider
antitrust and competition principles in assessing what is patentable
subject matter.131 Had the courts done so, it is doubtful that the flow of
software and business-methods patents would be at its present flood
stage.
Indeed, proper substantive economic balancing between
competition and temporary monopoly to provide incentives for
innovation might well eliminate whole classes of patents now allowed,
128.
129.
130.
131.

See FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 7-17 (executive summary).
See id. at 7-8 (executive summary, Recommendation 1).
See id. at 8-10 (Recommendation 2).
See id. at 14-15 (Recommendation 6).
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whose protection is economically counterproductive.
Finally, Alice might accuse the FTC White Paper of understating
the need for reform by largely neglecting the second most important
line-drawing problem in any patent system: the process by which courts
construe the breadth of patent claims and apply those claims to alleged
infringements. Although the FTC White Paper does briefly address the
doctrine of equivalents,132 its discussion is descriptive and
inconclusive.133 As Alice with her fresh approach would understand, the
scope of patentable subject matter and the scope of protection that a
patent provides go to the economic heart of any patent system. Their
burial in the list of recommendations, or their virtual neglect, does not do
them justice.
One last comment is worth making. The FTC white paper may be
misleading in a rather subtle respect. It focuses on the relationship
between patent law and antitrust law and suggests that patent law should
be construed and applied with competitive principles in mind.134 Alice
would heartily agree with that view, but she would think that it does not
go far enough. What is wrong with our patent system is not just that
courts often fail to apply competition principles properly when, for
example, they adjudicate patent licensing or similar commercial
disputes. What is wrong with our patent system is that patent law itself,
as practiced today, is seriously out of whack not only with competition
principles, but with basic economic common sense. The defect is not
just that patent law needs reform in its relationship to antitrust law.
Rather, based on economic common sense, Alice would claim that
patent law itself cries out for fundamental internal reform. It needs
reform in order to cohere with modern economic thinking on the
functioning of free markets and the role of entrepreneurial risk and
reward, as embodied in (among a large number of other things) the
antitrust law. In short, Alice would say is it not just the patent-antitrust
interface that needs a fresh look, but patent law itself.
The need for plenary reform is not surprising. The vintage of our
present patent statute is 1952. It became law not long after the end of
132. See id. at 6, 31-33.
133. See id. at 6. The FTC WHITE PAPER does, however, call for “seeking the right balance
between protection of the patentee and impact on outside competition.” Id. (footnote omitted).
134. See, e.g., FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 4-6 (executive summary, general remarks),
10-11 (Recommendation 3(a), suggesting that courts place greater emphasis on commercial success
in determining whether invention is obvious), 14 (Recommendations 5(d),and 6, suggesting
consideration of public interest and competition policy, generally and in extending patentable
subject matter), 17 (Recommendation 10, suggesting expanded consideration of economics
generally).
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the Second World War and before the Cold War was far under way.
Since that time, we have seen the advent of digital computers and
software, the rise of the integrated circuits and the modern
semiconductor industry, the discovery of DNA and the advent of
biotechnology, the “cracking” of the human genome, the genetic
engineering of plants and animals, and the exploration of space, not to
mention the explosion of free trade, the globalization of commerce, the
advent of the TRIPs Agreement, and wide-ranging advance in the
science of economics. Here is a partial list of modern innovative
industries that did not exist, or were in their infancy, when the patent law
was last substantially revised in 1952:
* alternative energy (biomass, ethanol, wind, geothermal)
* atomic energy
* biotechnology
* digital computers
* environmental protection (scrubbers, monitors, etc.)
* integrated circuits
* modern medical tools (e.g., CAT, MRI, and PET scans)
* semiconductors
* software
* space exploration and the part of “aerospace” beyond propeller
planes.
As this brief list shows, virtually all of the basic industries that
make up our “innovative” economy arose since the patent law was last
reformed. In addition, during the same period economic science grew
by leaps and bounds, with the help of the very computers, software, and
data processing techniques that these new industries fostered and made
possible. Isn’t is just possible, Alice would wonder, that all these
dramatic developments justify plenary and thorough reform of our patent
law?
Despite all that has happened since the adoption of the 1952 Patent
Act, Alice would see little difference in substance between it and the
patent exception in the Statute of Monopolies that she knows so well,
although the latter was drafted by the English Parliament nearly four
centuries ago. At least as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, it still
depends primarily on the concept of novelty to distinguish ordinary
business (which is subject to the rule of free competition and a
consequent prohibition on monopoly) from invention (which may
deserve limited-term patent protection). And, as so interpreted, its limits
still depend on a list of nouns like “manufacture,” rather than on a
deeper understanding of the economic rationale for patents. As for the
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term of the patents, it differs little from the fourteen-year term in the
Statute of Monopolies,135 which was based on twice the length of an
apprenticeship in the medieval trade guilds.136 The Federal Circuit has
even emasculated America’s historic attempt to include economic
factors, beginning with Jefferson’s “sufficiently useful and important”
language and culminating with today’s nonobviousness requirement.
Looking at the 1952 Act from a modern economic perspective, Alice
could only conclude that it has added little that was unknown in the time
of Queen Elizabeth I.
What Alice might fervently hope is that the FTC White Paper will
be the first step in a long process that will eventually result in a new
patent statute. She might hope that that process would be at least as
thorough and comprehensive the process that which produced the
Copyright Act of 1976. It should last five to ten years, include
administrative, economic and academic studies, and bring to bear the
considerable mass of legal and economic learning that humanity has
accumulated during the last half-century. That process may find, as did
the FTC itself, that different rules may be economically appropriate for
different industries.137 That is surely a decision that only Congress can
make, for the judiciary has neither the expertise nor any statutory basis
for making it.
As I suggested at the outset of this paper, the unique historical
context in which we find ourselves make laws governing innovation
among the most important for our nation’s economic future. Because
our nation is still a world leader, it perhaps is not too arrogant to say that
our own patent laws may have similar importance for the entire world.
It’s a good time, and there are many good reasons, to begin the process
of plenary revision.138 Alice, no doubt, would hope the FTC White
135. See STATUTE OF MONOPOLIES, supra note 8, §§ 6, 10.
136. See DARCY ARTICLE, supra note 6, at 895 n. 232.
137. Cf. FTC WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 4-14 (describing generally positive role of patents
in pharmaceutical industry); id. at 33-43, 48-53 (describing difficulties arising from “thicket” of
patents in computer hardware, semiconductor, software and Internet industries).
138. During the University of Akron’s Sixth Annual Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on
Intellectual Property Law and Policy, former Commissioner of Patents Bruce Lehman opined that
political realities might cause any attempt at patent revision to skew even more dramatically in favor
of a “land rush” toward economically unjustified private monopoly. The modern ability of industry
groups and trade associations, such as the patent bar, to influence Congress on legislation important
to their interests through lobbying certainly supports this view. Alice might hope that members of
Congress might pay close attention to the public interest in revising a statute that bears so directly
on our nation’s ability to survive economically in a globalized economy in which our comparative
advantage in manufacturing and farming will have vanished. In that hope as in others, however,
Alice might well be naive.
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Paper gives us all a much-needed shove in that direction.
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